Appeals from Claim Rejections by Bickford, Hugh C.
Journal of Accountancy 
Volume 47 Issue 3 Article 3 
3-1929 
Appeals from Claim Rejections 
Hugh C. Bickford 
Follow this and additional works at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/jofa 
 Part of the Accounting Commons, and the Taxation Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Bickford, Hugh C. (1929) "Appeals from Claim Rejections," Journal of Accountancy: Vol. 47 : Iss. 3 , Article 
3. 
Available at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/jofa/vol47/iss3/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Archival Digital Accounting Collection at eGrove. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Accountancy by an authorized editor of eGrove. For more information, 
please contact egrove@olemiss.edu. 
Appeals from Claim Rejections
By Hugh C. Bickford
The suggestion has been made that the jurisdiction of the board 
of tax appeals be enlarged to enable it to pass upon suits for the 
recovery of taxes, in addition to its present power to review de­
terminations of deficiencies as made by the commissioner of 
internal revenue. The thought has a parental wish. Obviously, 
the wish is that there be some judicial body with authority to 
review decisions of the commissioner in cases where his view is 
considered erroneous and it is found, due to the particular status 
of the case, that the board does not have jurisdiction.
The suggestion should be carefully weighed. When one finds 
a tribunal with over twenty thousand unheard cases on its docket 
and learns, as a result, that his case, when filed, must wait for 
several years before it is tried, and even longer before it is decided, 
one must express some doubt as to the wisdom of increasing the 
business of that tribunal and further submerging its functions 
beneath the flood of a new class of cases. The fact remains, 
however, that this board can not review many decisions of the 
commissioner, such as rejections of claims for refund, and that 
these decisions are as likely to require review and correction as 
those which result in deficiencies and may, therefore, be carried 
to the board. The fact which is too generally ignored is that 
there is ample opportunity of reviewing the commissioner’s 
actions on refund claims without going to the board. The writer 
refers to review by the federal courts. This right existed before 
the board was established and if it had been resorted to more fre­
quently probably would have made unnecessary the creation of 
the board in the first instance.
Before the creation of the board there was not one case in many 
thousands which reached the courts. Yet, at that time, the com­
missioner was handing down the same decisions which are being 
made today, with the same, if not a greater degree of inaccuracy 
than that which now prompts the filing of so many petitions with 
the board. True, there was no mode of obtaining relief until after 
the tax was paid but even this relief was not often sought because 
of the generally prevailing hesitancy to go into court.
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The effect of the creation of the board upon tax practice has 
been marked in many respects, but in none so plainly as in the 
effect upon those who represent taxpayers. They now unhesi­
tatingly turn to the board for the courtlike relief which it affords, 
and, in so doing, they have learned the magic of sworn testimony 
and documentary proof, properly presented, and of logical 
argument, timely made. They have learned that public 
decisions based upon a public record are rather less arbitrary 
and infinitely more satisfactory in ultimate result. Strangely, 
however, there is still the same hesitancy to seek the relief which 
the courts afford and still the same ungrounded fear of suits for 
recovery.
One sometimes wonders if the hesitancy was or is caused by 
the fact that tax representatives, generally, are not trial lawyers, 
and reach the conclusion that if the case is carried into the courts 
it will mean that they will have to relinquish its control. The 
thought is too repugnant to bear emphasis. Surely, no profes­
sional man, whether he be an accountant or office lawyer, would 
be guilty of restricting the rights of his clients to the limits of his 
own capabilities.
The writer does not wish to enter the dog-eared discussion as 
to which is best qualified to handle a tax case—the accountant 
or the lawyer. He sometimes thinks that one must be both; and, 
likewise, an economist, a statistician, a paragon of patience, yea, 
even a psychologist, for else how could one know just the proper 
time to admire the cravat of the conferee? Undoubtedly, how­
ever, there is need at times for the British system of the divided 
sphere of solicitor and advocate. When the solicitor has con­
ducted, out of court, all negotiations and conferences seeking to 
obtain for his client a just settlement, and has failed, it is his duty, 
in a proper case, to recommend trial and to arrange for the ad­
vocate, or barrister, to conduct the trial of the case. So, in tax 
cases, when the accountant, or office lawyer, has exhausted all 
proper means before the department and has failed to obtain 
that which it is honestly believed his client is justly entitled to, 
it is his duty to advise his client of his right to recover by court 
action and to bring to that proceeding, in an advisory capacity, 
the knowledge and experience which he has derived from the 
negotiations before the department. Otherwise, the representa­
tive has failed to apprise his client of his full remedy and has 
subjugated the rights of the cause to his own limitations.
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For example, some months ago there was a case pending 
before the treasury department involving the valuation of a 
patent. The inventor had conducted the business of manufac­
turing the patented article as a sole proprietorship for seven 
years. His inventive genius was far superior to his business 
sagacity and the company lost money in virtually every year. 
Finally, a corporation (let us steal the department’s custom and 
call it the M Company) was formed and the patent, together with 
all other assets of the business, was paid in for capital stock. 
Stock having a par value of two million dollars was issued for 
the patent, and the M Company subsequently claimed as deduc­
tions from gross income the amortization of that amount. The 
department applied its well known formula, based solely upon 
earnings, and held the patent to be worthless with the result that 
the entire deduction was disallowed. Affidavits were obtained 
from several nationally known experts in the art who testified 
that in their opinion the patented article was the best of its kind 
in the world—a distinct and highly valuable contribution to 
commerce and to science. Hundreds of original letters were 
exhibited which contained orders for the article which had not 
been filled because of the limited facilities of the business as it had 
been conducted. Finally, several business men of the community 
executed affidavits that several months before the incorporation 
of the business they had offered one million dollars for the patent 
and had been turned down by the proprietor, and, further, that 
they had agreed among themselves to pay two million if they could 
get the patent. Spokesmen of the unit said they “didn’t know 
these men; they didn’t know whether they had two million dollars; 
they didn’t know whether they would have given it if they had 
had it.” (Any tax representative knows the rest of their answer.) 
Affidavits were filed by prominent bankers testifying that the 
men making the offer were the wealthiest and best type of men in 
the community (character witnesses). Finally, letters were filed 
from members of congress from that locality testifying to the 
honesty and reputation of the bankers and of the offering syndi­
cate. The unit continued to point out that the patent had never 
produced any actual profits, but finally yielded sufficiently to 
allow a value of one million dollars. The case was carried into 
court. There the same witnesses were called. Their testimony 
was convincing and the government offered no rebuttal. It was 
not necessary there to bring in a second group of witnesses to 
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prove that the first witnesses were not liars and a third group to 
prove that the second were honest. The two-million-dollar 
valuation was allowed. A hesitancy to go into court in this case 
would have cost the clients many thousands of dollars.
Still another illustration. A partnership claimed special assess­
ment under section 210 of the revenue act of 1917. The partner­
ship was a commission house and argued that it had done over 
six million dollars’ worth of business for its clients on a capital of 
only $16,000. It kept no books of the total business handled but 
only of the net commissions received. By consistent rule of the 
trade such commissions were paid at the rate of one and one- 
quarter per cent. of the business handled and amounted to $75,000 
for the taxable year. Capitalizing this amount, the figure of 
$6,000,000 was easily obtained. The department refused to 
believe that $75,000 in commissions meant a total business han­
dled amounting to $6,000,000. One representative in the de­
partment went so far as to intimate that inasmuch as that figure 
was not on the books, somebody must be fabricating. Affidavits, 
briefs, protests, photostats of the books and all other evidence 
requested were filed with the department, but the claim was 
rejected. The case was carried into court where the same evidence 
was presented which had been exhibited to the department. The 
government’s arbitrary opinion was not competent evidence. 
The court specially found the facts without question. A hesi­
tancy to go into the courts in this case would have cost the client 
considerable in taxes which he did not legally owe. The illus­
trations could be presented ad infinitum. The point is that there 
should be no such indecision, in a proper case, to claim a right 
which the law gives. The answer in such cases lies in the courts.
To place one in the proper position to advise court action and 
to arrange for its commencement, it is necessary to know the 
remedies provided. The principal class of cases will be those in 
which the taxes have been paid and claims for refund rejected. 
Before suit may be brought for the recovery of such taxes all of 
the prerequisites established by law must have been observed. 
It must be borne in mind that the sovereign may not be sued 
without its consent, and, if it has attached purely formal conditions 
to its consent to be sued, these conditions must be complied with. 
As Mr. Justice Holmes has stated: “ Men must turn square corners 
when they deal with the government.” The conditions to be 
fulfilled before suit may be commenced are contained in section 
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1113 of the revenue act of 1926, amending section 3226 of the 
Revised Statutes. Briefly stated, they are:
1. The tax must have been paid.
2. Within the statutory period of limitations a proper claim for 
refund must have been filed.
3. The claim for refund must have been rejected, or, if not re­
jected, must have been pending before the commissioner for 
at least six months.
4. The suit must be brought within five years from the date the 
tax was paid or within two years after the claim was re­
jected.
Numerous decisions have been made involving these conditions, 
the most important of which are to the effect that the claim which 
forms the basis for the suit must be a proper claim for refund or 
credit. A claim for abatement or an informal claim is not suffi­
cient. Likewise, the claim must have been based upon the same 
grounds which form the basis of the suit. A suit upon one ground 
may not be founded upon a claim for refund stating entirely 
different grounds.
These steps should be taken during the pendency of the motion 
before the department with the definite thought in mind that a 
proper foundation shall be laid for future court action. Other­
wise, due to the statute of limitations, it may be too late to lay 
the proper foundation after the department has made its rejection. 
In this respect the negotiations before the department are similar 
to a trial in the lower court. The foundation for the appeal must 
be laid during the trial. It is too late when the trial court has 
entered its judgment.
The preliminary conditions having been fulfilled, it is necessary 
to consider the nature of the suit to be brought and the court in 
which it should be brought. There are two branches of the 
judiciary in which the suit may be filed. The action may be 
brought in a federal district court, of which there are now over 
eighty sitting in the various federal judicial districts of the United 
States. On the other hand, suit may be filed in the United States 
court of claims at Washington. We will consider the classes of 
actions to be brought in each of these courts.
As stated above, a sovereign state may not be sued without its 
consent. At common law, however, the judges found a mode 
for avoiding the stringency of this rule in cases where taxes had 
been illegally collected. They permitted suits, sounding in 
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assumpsit, to be brought against the collector to whom the taxes 
were paid, provided the taxpayer had paid the taxes under duress 
or protest and had thus put the collector on notice that the taxes 
were considered illegal and that suit for their recovery would be 
instituted. In the absence of such a protest there was no way 
at common law for recovering taxes which had been illegally paid. 
This common-law right to sue the collector was adopted by the 
federal courts of this country and is recognized today. However, 
section 1116 of the revenue act of 1926 has relieved taxpayers of 
the necessity of paying the taxes under protest. The suit against 
the collector may be brought in any amount and must be filed 
in the district in which the defendant, the collector, is a resident 
at the time the suit is filed.
The rigor of the common-law inhibition against suits against 
the sovereign was relaxed by the enactment, in 1887, of the Tucker 
act, which made it possible to sue the United States directly for 
“claims not exceeding $10,000 founded upon the constitution of 
the United States or any law of congress, or upon any regulation 
of an executive department.” Suits for the recovery of taxes 
illegally collected have been held to be included within this defini­
tion. Further, the revenue act of 1921 amended the Tucker act 
to allow suits for taxes to be brought against the United States 
“even though the claim exceeds $10,000, if the collector by whom 
such tax, penalty, or sum was collected, is dead or not in office 
at the time the suit or proceeding is commenced.” This obviates 
the necessity of proceeding against collectors long since gone 
from office, or against the personal representatives of deceased 
collectors. Where the United States is named as defendant, the 
Tucker act requires that the petition must be filed in the district 
in which the plaintiff resides.
In all such cases in the federal courts the rules of practice and 
procedure are the same as in other civil suits. The “Rules of 
decisions” act of 1789 has been held to require the district courts 
to follow the rules of evidence enforced by the state courts of the 
state in which the district court sits. The conformity act of 1872 
requires that the practice, pleadings and form and mode of 
proceeding in the federal courts shall conform to like practice in 
the state courts. These statutes apply to suits to recover taxes.
Summarizing, we find that in the district courts the practice in 
tax suits is largely the same as in any other civil suit. If the 
amount sued for is less than $10,000 the action for recovery 
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may be brought either against the collector or against the United 
States. If, however, the taxes total more than that amount, 
the action must be brought against the collector to whom the 
taxes were paid, unless he is dead or out of office, and in that event 
the United States may be named as defendant. Only one class 
of suit is permitted; the taxpayer may not join both the collector 
and the United States as defendants.
Suits in the court of claims will be found more acceptable in 
many respects. The action there may be brought in any sum and 
regardless of the status of the collector to whom the taxes were 
paid. In that court the United States is always named as de­
fendant. Another important advantage is that the docket of 
the court is not so crowded as in many of the district courts. 
More important, however, is the manner of taking testimony and 
conducting the hearing.
The taking of oral testimony before the court of claims at a 
formal hearing is a rare occurrence. Under statutory authority 
there have been appointed a number of commissioners of the 
court whose duty it is, under the law and the rules of the court, 
to take testimony and making findings of fact. Virtually all of 
the testimony in cases pending before the court is taken under 
the jurisdiction of these commissioners. The rules provide that 
where convenient the testimony shall be taken in the county 
in which the witness resides. The rules likewise provide for the 
taking of testimony on deposition before a notary public or other 
officer authorized to certify to such testimony. When the petition 
is filed with the court and answer made by the government (usually 
a general traverse, or denial) the case is assigned to one of the 
commissioners for a report of the facts. Arrangements can then 
be made with the commissioner to produce the witnesses before 
him or to take depositions before a duly authorized officer of the 
locality in which the witnesses reside. In some instances the 
testimony is taken both by deposition and orally before the 
commissioner. At the conclusion of the testimony the parties 
will be permitted to file with the commissioner suggested findings 
of fact based upon the testimony adduced. The commissioner 
then makes his report to the court and the parties are allowed 
thirty days within which to object to his findings. These objec­
tions will be passed upon by the court. Briefs are then filed by 
the parties and in due course the case is set down for oral argument 
before the court itself. Thus, in the usual case, the only actual 
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appearance before the judges of the court is to make oral argument 
on the basis of findings of fact as reported by the commissioner 
and the printed briefs already filed.
It will readily be seen that the procedure before the court of 
claims is likely to be more convenient and expeditious in tax 
cases. It is certain that the procedure there is no more difficult 
and the rules of pleading and evidence no more stringent than 
those which are enforced by the board of tax appeals, and there 
should be no more hesitancy, in a proper case, in seeking the 
relief which this court affords than there now is in petitioning the 
board of tax appeals for a redetermination of a deficiency.
In all probability, if a case has justified the expense and in­
convenience of a long and vexatious litigation before the treasury 
department, court action is likewise justified. At all events, it is 
certainly the duty of the representative of the taxpayer, when he 
believes that an erroneous decision has been rendered by the 
department, to apprise his client of the further possible relief by 
an appeal to the courts and to place before him the full facts of 
the matter so as to enable him independently to reach a decision 
whether or not to proceed with the case.
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